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NOTES
AMERICAN ANTITRUST LIABILITY OF FOREIGN
STATE INSTRUMENTALITIES: A NEW APPLICATION
OF THE PARKER DOCTRINE
The impact of foreign commercial enterprise on the American economy
has increased dramatically in recent years.' Much of this increase reflects
the efforts of private foreign companies.2 But the expanded role of national
governments in conducting traditionally private commercial enterprises3
has also contributed to the assault on the American market,4 raising the
question of whether the actions of foreign governments and their instru-
mentalities are immune from U.S. antitrust laws.5
This Note will first examine those cases that have considered the extrater-
ritorial application of the antitrust laws against foreign governments and
their instrumentalities. Recent applications of the state action doctrine,6
which generally grants antitrust immunity to governmental activities, will
1. The U.S. foreign trade deficit for 1977 was $26.7 billion, more than four times the 1976
figure of $5.9 billion and $20.3 billion above the previous record of $6.4 billion set in 1972.
N.Y. Times, Jan. 31, 1978, at 1, col. 1. The foreign trade deficit for February 1978 was $4.52
billion, the largest monthly deficit in American history. N.Y. Times, Apr. 1, 1978, at 1, col. I
(city ed.). See generallyINTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT 20-27 (1977).
2. Foreign direct investment in the United States rose $2.5 billion, or nine percent, in 1976,
to $30.2 billion. This has been attributed to "the recovery of the American economy as well as
recent changes in relative costs of production that have made the United States a more attrac-
tive location for foreign investment." [1977] BALANCE OF PAYMENTS REP. (CCH) 1 9292.
3. The Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) is the leading recent ex-
ample of this phenomenon. See Note, LAC. Section 999: Taxing the Arab Boycott, 10 CoR-
NELL INT'L L.J. 280, 280 & nn.l-4. For an attempt to measure the economic effect of OPEC
pricing policies on other nations, see Lea, Worldwide Financial Implications of Higher Oil
Prices BRITISH-NORTH AMERICAN COMMITTEE, HIGHER OIL PRICES: WORLDWIDE FINAN-
CIAL IMPLICATIONS 1 (1975). See also Barraclough, International Reactions to the Problens of
the Steel Trade, 77 DEP'T STATE BULL. 742, 745-46 (Nov. 21, 1977). The expanded role of
governments in formerly private economic activity was noted in Pfizer, Inc. v. Government of
India, 98 S. Ct. 584, 593 (1978) (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
4. SeeBarraclough, supranote 3, at 745-50. Authorities disagree on whether government
assistance actually helps foreign industries in international markets. Compare Briggs, Steel
Imports: They're Your Problem Tool, 44 VITAL SPEECHES 73, 75 (Nov. 15, 1977) with Bar-
raclough, spra note 3, at 746, 750.
5. The basic provisions of American antitrust law are contained in the Sherman Act, 15
U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1976) and the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27 (1976).
6. See notes 29-65 infra and accompanying text.
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be considered, and an analytic framework will be proposed for assessing the
potential antitrust liability of governmental entities. The Note will then
adapt this analysis to the international setting, consider the implications of
the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976,7 and apply the proposed
immunity analysis to a hypothetical case.
I
AMERICAN ANTITRUST LAW AND FOREIGN
GOVERNMENTS
There have been few attempts to apply American antitrust laws against
foreign sovereigns and their instrumentalities or against private conspira-
cies that were furthered by acts of foreign governments. The courts that
have considered the issue have not agreed on a rule governing the liability
of foreign sovereigns. This lack of consensus is illustrated by two cases in
which a foreign government was a party to an alleged conspiracy in re-
straint of trade: United States v. Deutsches Kalsyndikat GesellschaftP and In
re Investigation of World Arrangements.9
In Deutsches Kalisyndikat, the United States alleged antitrust violations
by the Soci~t6 Commercial des Potasses d'Alsace, an enterprise established
by the French Government to sell potash and owned jointly by the Govern-
ment and private parties.' 0 The French Ambassador invoked the doctrine
of foreign sovereign immunity and urged the district court to quash service
of process upon the Soci6t." In denying the claim of immunity and up-
holding service, 12 the court emphasized both the partly private ownership
and operation of the Soci6te,13 and the fact that persons other than the
sovereign or its representative had engaged in anticompetitive acts within
the United States.14
7. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1602-1611 (1976).
8. 31 F.2d 199 (S.D.N.Y. 1929).
9. 13 F.R.D. 280 (D.D.C. 1952).
10. 31 F.2d at 202. The French Government owned eleven-fifteenths of the capital stock
and controlled the Soci6te's governing board. Id. at 200.
11. Id at 201.
12. Id at 203.
13. Seenote 10 supra
14. 31 F.2d at 201. The emphasis that the court placed on acts within the jurisdiction of the
United States may be attributable to the fact that the case antedated by sixteen years United
States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945). In that case Judge Learned
Hand cast aside the longstanding rule that allegedly unlawful antitrust conspiracies must be
formed or to some extent be carried out within the United States. See generally Simson, The
Return ofAmerican Banana: A Contemporary Ferspective on American Antitrust Abroad, 9 J.
INT'L L. & EcON. 233, 235-41 (1974). Cf. Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp. v. Maxwell,
468 F.2d 1326, 1335 (2d Cir. 1972) (telephone calls and mail to the United States constitute
conduct within the United States for jurisdictional purposes where violations of § 10(b) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1976), are alleged).
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World Arrangements produced the opposite result. During a grand jury
investigation of possible Sherman Act violations by multinational oil com-
panies, the court concluded that the British Government's stock holdings in
the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company rendered the company immune from juris-
diction,15 despite the fact that the Government's share of the total stock in
the company was smaller than that of the French Government in Deutsches
Kalisyndikat. 6 Since the court discerned no conceptual differences between
the two cases, it distinguished them on their facts, stating that "[t]here is a
vast distinction between a seafaring island-nation maintaining a constant
supply of maritime fuel and a government seeking additional revenue in the
American markets and causing a direct injury in the United States to our
domestic commercial structure."17
More consistent in their results, but no more decisive on the issue of anti-
trust liability of foreign sovereign instrumentalities, are several cases in
which the foreign government furthered the challenged activity, but did not
participate in it. The defendants in United States v. Sisal Sales Corp.18 se-
cured passage of legislation in Mexico that effectively eliminated from the
sisal market all selling agents other than the defendants' corporation.' 9 In
15. In reInvestigation of World Arrangements, 13 F.R.D. 280, 291 (D.D.C. 1952); Vf. In re
Grand Jury Investigation of the Shipping Indus., 186 F. Supp. 298, 319 (D.D.C. 1960) (sug-
gesting that "[tihe present case seems to fall somewhere in between the World Arrangements
and the [Deutsches Kalisyndikat] Gesellschaft cases."). The district court in the Shiping
Industry case was able to resolve the jurisdictional issue by finding that the defendants' activi-
ties were "commercial" and therefore were not immune from the antitrust laws. Id. This made
it unnecessary to consider the extent of the Government's involvement in the activity and the
effects of that involvement on jurisdiction.
16. In World Arrangements, the British Government held only "slightly better than one-
third of the capital investment" of Anglo-Iranian, 13 F.R.D. at 290, compared to the eleven-
fifteenths interest held by the French Government in Deutsches Kalsyndikat, see note 10
supra. The World Arrangements court sought to deemphasize this smaller share by stressing
that it was still sufficient to control the corporation. 13 F.R.D. at 290.
17. Id. at 291. The court also distinguished Deutsches Kalisyndikaton the ground that the
alleged antitrust violations involved commercial activity rather than a governmental function
as in WorldArrangements Id However, the WorldArrangements court had earlier defined the
governmental nature of Anglo-Iranian's function by reference to the test stated in Berizzi Bros.
v. The Pesaro, 271 U.S. 562, 574 (1926), which provided that merchant ships "held and used by
a [foreign] government for a public purpose" will be immune from U.S. jurisdiction. 13 F.R.D.
at 290. Using that standard, the Socit6's activities in Deutsches Kalisyndikat would certainly
have qualified as "governmental" and therefore been immune. But see Foreign Sovereign Im-
munities Act of 1976, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1602-1611 (1976); notes 95-101 infra and accompanying
text.
18. 274 U.S. 268 (1927).
19. Id. at 273. See also United States v. Bechtel Corp., [1977] 5 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH)
50,304 (proposed consent judgment). The government action in Bechtel, although indirect,
was necessary to a conspiracy of private parties who refused to deal with subcontractors on the
Arab blacklist and required subcontractors not to do business with other blacklisted persons.
Unlike the Sisal Salesconspiracy, the Bechtelscheme was instigated by foreign governments,
which required the private parties to cooperate as a condition of doing business in Arab na-
tions. ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) No. 762 at F-l, F-2 (1976).
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Continental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp.,20 the Canadian
Governor General appointed the defendants' wholly owned subsidiary as
the Government's exclusive agent for the purchase of certain metals during
World War II. The subsidiary allegedly used its power to benefit its parent
and exclude competitors from the market.2 1 United States v. Watchmakers
of Switzerland Information Center22 involved the Swiss Government's
financial 23 and legislative24 assistance to the beleaguered Swiss watch in-
dustry's efforts to protect itself against competition.
In each of these cases, the court held that the foreign government's con-
duct did not shield private defendants from antitrust liability;25 but the le-
gality of the actions of the governments was not put in issue.2 6 The only
recent challenge to anticompetitive activity of foreign government instru-
mentalities was the action brought by the Justice Department in United
States v. Pan American WorldAirways, Inc.27 That case, however, was set-
tled by consent decree,28 so the issue of the antitrust liability of foreign
government entities remains open. Where foreign government instrumen-
talities have restrained trade, the courts have reached conflicting conclu-
sions; and where foreign governments have furthered private restraints,
courts have limited their consideration of the liability issue to the private
defendants. To determine whether foreign governments and their instru-
mentalities may be liable for violating the U.S. antitrust laws, it is therefore
necessary to examine the status of domestic state governments and their
20. 370 U.S. 690 (1962).
21. Id at 695.
22. [1963] Trade Cas. 70,600 (S.D.N.Y. 1962), order modfed, [1965] Trade Cas. 70,352
(S.D.N.Y. 1965).
23. The Swiss Government contributed money to the holding company, the Soci6t6 G~n-
drale de L'Horlogerie Suisse S.A. (ASUAG), which took control of all firms producing certain
watch components. The Government also acquired a minority of ASUAG's stock and minor-
ity representation on its board of directors. [1963] Trade Cas. 70,600, at 77,428.
24. The Swiss Government approved the protective effect of the Watchmakers' Convention
by enacting legislation that conditioned issuance of export permits for watch components on
compliance with the convention. Id.
25. Continental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp., 370 U.S. 690, 706 (1962);
United States v. Sisal Sales Corp., 274 U.S. 268, 276 (1927); United States v. Watchmakers of
Switz. Information Center, [19631 Trade Cas. 70,600, at 77,456-57 (S.D.N.Y. 1962).
26. The Continental Ore Court emphasized that Continental did not question the Canadian
Government's delegation of power to Union Carbides subsidiary. 370 U.S. at 702-03 n.l 1,
706.
27. No. 77-197 (D.D.C., filed Feb. 3, 1977), [1977] 4 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 145,077 (case
no. 2560, 2561) (complaint noted). The Justice Department asserted that agreements setting
prices for military excursion fares among international air passenger carriers, including Luft-
hansa German Airlines, constituted illegal price fixing. The Justice Department has indicated
its strong commitment to an antitrust policy that protects the American consuming public.
ANTITRUST DIVISION, U.S. DEP'T OF JUsTIcE, ANTITRUST GUIDE FOR INTERNATIONAL OPER-
ATIONS 4 (1977), reprinted in ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) No. 799, at E-1 (1977)
andTRADE REG. REPORTS (CCH) No. 266, pt. 11 (1977). See also Davidow, Recent Develop-
ments in InternationalAntitrust, 10 AKRON L. REV. 603 (1977).
28. [1977] 5 TRADE REG. REP. (CC-) 1 50,353 (D.D.C., filed Dec. 9, 1977).
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instrumentalities and to develop an analysis applicable in the international
field.
II
STATE ACTION AND ANTITRUST IMMUNITY
A. THE Parker DOCTRINE
Although few antitrust suits have involved foreign states, many suits have
been brought against domestic states and their instrumentalities. In the
leading case, Parker v. Brown 29 and several recent decisions, including City
of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 30 Goldfarb v. Virginia State
Bar,3 1 and Bates v. State Bar ofArizona,32 the Supreme Court has outlined
the scope of antitrust immunity. The Court has applied Parker to various
types of governmental bodies, tailoring its analysis to the differences in the
factual patterns presented. Although it did not involve a governmental
body, Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co.33 is also instructive on the question of
antitrust immunity. In addition, the Supreme Court held in Pfizer, Inc. v.
Government ofIndia34 that foreign states may bring antitrust suits for treble
damages, 3 5 indicating a willingness to treat foreign and domestic states sim-
ilarly for some purposes.36 This suggests that, although domestic applica-
tion of the antitrust laws cannot parallel international application
perfectly,37 future developments in international antitrust law may involve
29. 317 U.S. 341 (1943). The first case to raise this issue was Olsen v. Smith, 195 U.S. 332
(1904), which involved a challenge to Texas statutes limiting employment as port pilots to
those licensed by the state. The Court held that "no monopoly or combination in a legal sense
can arise from the fact that the duly authorized agents of the State are alone allowed to per-
form the duties devolving upon them by law." Id. at 345.
30. 98 S. Ct. 1123 (1978).
31. 421 U.S. 773 (1975).
32. 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
33. 428 U.S. 579 (1976).
34. 98 S. Ct. 584 (1978).
35. Id. at 591. The Court in Pfizerheld that foreign sovereigns were "persons" within the
meaning of§ 4 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1976). 98 S. Ct. at 588-90. CfS. 2395, 95th
Cong., 2d Sess., 124 CONG. REC. S28 (daily ed. Jan. 19, 1978) (limiting recovery by foreign
states in antitrust suits to actual damages); S. 2486, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., 124 CONG. REc.
SI 190 (daily ed. Feb. 6, 1978) (barring standing of foreign sovereigns to sue under American
antitrust law except where (1) the sovereign recognizes general rights of U.S. persons and U.S.
Government to bring civil suits in that country's courts, and (2) the sovereign has laws prohib-
iting restrictive trade practices); S. 2724, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., 124 CONG. REC. S3461 (daily ed.
Feb. 6, 1978) (foreign sovereigns will have standing in U.S. courts only if U.S. persons and
U.S. Government have equivalent access and relief for the same injury in the courts of the
foreign sovereign).
36. Georgia v. Evans, 316 U.S. 159 (1942), held that domestic states were "persons" within
the meaning of § 7 of the Sherman Act. Congress has since repealed that section because it
duplicated § 4 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1976). Act of July 7, 1955, ch. 283, § 3, 69
Stat. 282.
37. See notes 86-91 infra and accompanying text.
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application of current domestic doctrines.38
In Parker v. Brown39 plaintiffs alleged that the efforts of the State of Cali-
fornia to control the marketing of the state's raisin crop violated the Sher-
man Act. Determining that Congress had not intended the Sherman Act to
apply to restraints of trade imposed by a state acting as sovereign, the
Supreme Court held that California's program did not violate the antitrust
laws.4° The Court warned that this immunity did not extend to a state par-
ticipating in an essentially private scheme to restrain trade,41 or to private
parties whose actions the state had merely authorized or declared to be law-
ful.42 But formal action by the state itself to create the restraint of trade
would immunize the state from antitrust attack.43
City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co."4 presented the question
of whether cities share this immunity from the antitrust laws. Two cities
owned and operated electric utilities serving customers both within and be-
yond the city limits. One of the cities competed in the latter market with the
Louisiana Power & Light Company, and, to improve its position, allegedly
tied gas and water service for nonresident customers to the purchase of elec-
tricity. Also, both cities allegedly engaged in sham litigation against Louisi-
ana Power & Light to delay approval and construction of a new electric
generating plant. Although Parker held that restraints of trade imposed by
a state acting as sovereign were not barred by the antitrust laws, the Court
decided in City of Lafayette that "in the absence of evidence that the State
authorized or directed a given municipality to act as it did, the actions of a
particular city hardly can be found to be pursuant to 'the state['s] com-
mand,' or to be restraints that 'the state . . . as sovereign' imposed."'45 In
other words, "when the State itself has not directed or authorized an an-
ticompetitive practice, the State's subdivisions in exercising their delegated
power must obey the antitrust laws."46
38. The pattern of development in this area has been for the Court to decide first whether a
particular governmental body may bring suit under the antitrust laws, and then whether it may
also be sued. Compare Georgia v. Evans, 316 U.S. 159 (1942) (state may bring suit) with
Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943) (state may not be sued); compare also Chattanooga
Foundry & Pipe Works v. City of Atlanta, 203 U.S. 390 (1906) (city may bring suit) with City
of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 98 S. Ct. 1123 (1978) (city may be sued). If this
pattern continues, the Court, following its decision in Pfizer, may eventually have to decide
whether foreign governments may be sued under U.S. antitrust laws. It is likely to base its
decision on cases involving the antitrust liability of domestic governmental bodies.
39. 317 U.S. 341 (1943).
40. Id. at 352.
41. Id. at 351-52. See, e.g, Harman v. Valley Nat'l Bank of Ariz., 339 F.2d 564, 566 (9th
Cir. 1964) (state attorney general alleged to be co-conspirator in scheme to monopolize com-
mercial banking and finance in state).
42. 317 U.S. at 351.
43. Id at 352.
44. 98 S. Ct. 1123 (1978).
45. Id. at 1137 (quoting Parker).
46. d. at 1138.
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Both Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar47 and Bates v. State Bar ofArizona48
involved antitrust charges against state bar associations. 49 The Court ap-
plied a stricter test than in City of Lafayette to decide the claims of immu-
nity, apparently because such associations are further removed from the
state than are municipalities. In Goldfarb, the Court noted that, although
the Virginia Supreme Court had delegated supervisory power over the
state's legal profession to the bar association,50 there was nothing to suggest
that the Virginia court had required or even approved a violation of the
antitrust laws.5 ' Despite the bar association's position as a state agency
under Virginia law,52 the Supreme Court found that it was a state agency
only for limited purposes-purposes that did not "allow it to foster an-
ticompetitive practices for the benefit of its members."53 Because the bar
association was not equivalent to the state, and since the state had not im-
posed the challenged restraint of trade, the bar association was open to anti-
trust attack.
By contrast, the challenged restraint in Bates resulted from an "affirma-
tive commandof the Arizona Supreme Court,. . the ultimate body wield-
ing the State's power over the practice of law."54 This command sprang
from "the State's power to protect the public"55 and contained "a clear ar-
ticulation of the State's policy with regard to professional behavior."56 Be-
cause the Arizona court could be considered to be the state acting as
sovereign, the Arizona bar association's implementation of the challenged
restraint enjoyed immunity from antitrust attack.57 The Supreme Court in-
dicated, however, that it might have reached a different result had the Ari-
zona court simply authorized the implementation of such a restraint, rather
than commanded it.58 Thus, the test applicable to bodies such as bar as-
sociations is more stringent than that applicable to municipalities,5 9 for
47. 421 U.S. 773 (1975).
48. 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
49. In Goldfarb, the alleged violation was the imposition and enforcement of a minimum
fee schedule. 421 U.S. at 775. Bates involved a ban on lawyer advertising. 433 U.S. at 353.
50. 421 U.S. at 776.
51. Cf. Surety Title Ins. Agency, Inc. v. Virginia State Bar, 431 F. Supp. 298 (E.D. Va.
1977) (issuance of ethical opinions by bar association compelled by the Commonwealth of
Virginia through its Supreme Court did not fall within state action exemption to antitrust
laws).
52. 421 U.S. at 789-90.
53. Id. The Court found that the bar association had "voluntarily joined in what [was]
essentially a private anticompetitive activity. ... Id. at 792. See note 41 supra and accom-
panying text.
54. 433 U.S. at 360.
55. Id. at 361.
56. Id. at 362. The Court also noted that the rule was "subject to pointed re-examination by
the policymaker-the Arizona Supreme Court-in enforcement proceedings." Id.
57. Id. at 359-60.
58. Id.
59. See text accompanying notes 45-46 supra.
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which state authorization is sufficient.
Had Detroit Edison, the defendant in Cantor,60 been a governmental
body, it too might have enjoyed antitrust immunity.61 The Michigan Public
Service Commission had approved the anticompetitive practice with which
the company was charged, 62 and state law required Detroit Edison to con-
tinue the practice while that approval remained in effect.63 But Detroit
Edison was a privately owned company, and the Supreme Court rejected its
claims of immunity because the Public Service Commission had not im-
posed the challenged restraint of trade. Rather, the option to initiate it had
been Detroit Edison's.64 The Court also emphasized that the alleged an-
ticompetitive practice did not further any important state policies.65 The
test applicable to private entities thus appears to be even more stringent
than that for bodies such as bar associations: unless the restraint has been
imposed by the state to promote important state policies, the private entity
implementing it will enjoy no immunity.
This series of cases outlines the antitrust liability of domestic states and
their instrumentalities. By focusing on the nature of the defendant charged
with violating the antitrust laws, and by applying the appropriate test for
immunity, it should be possible to decide whether that defendant will be
subject to liability or will instead enjoy Parker's protection. It is therefore
necessary to examine both which characteristics of a party determine the
test to be applied and what is needed to satisfy each of these tests.
B. A PROPOSED ANALYSIS
The succession of recent Parker doctrine cases has replaced the basic
Parker analysis with a series of fact-oriented immunity tests. Analysis of
cases in which a governmental entity asserts state action immunity is, as a
result, a two-step process: a determination of which test applies and an eval-
uation of whether it has been satisfied. The choice of a proper test requires
examining the closeness of the relationship between the defendant and the
ultimate sources of sovereign authority. The possibilities are broadly divisi-
ble into three groups.
Ultimate governmental bodies6 6 wield the full authority of the state. This
60. 428 U.S. 579 (1976).
61. Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 361 (1977) (" Cantorwould have been an en-
tirely different case if the claim had been directed against a public official or public agency,
rather than against a private party.").
62. Detroit Edison had instituted a program that tied the distribution of light bulbs to the
sale of electricity. 428 U.S. at 582.
63. Id. at 585.
64. Id. at 594.
65. Id. at 585.
66. Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 360 (1977) (the Arizona Supreme Court "is the
ultimate body wielding the State's power over the practice of law. .... ).
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group encompasses (a) the state legislature and statutory agencies;67 (b) the
state executive and executive departments; 68 and (c) the state judiciary.69 In
most cases, then, ultimate governmental bodies are identical with the sover-
eign.
Subordinate governmental bodies7 derive their authority from an ulti-
mate governmental body. They include: (a) state governmental subdivi-
sions71 and their instrumentalities 72-typically local or regional
governmental entities whose authority is expressly limited to that delegated
to them by an ultimate governmental body; (b) state agencies for limited
purposes 73-private organizations that assume the full power and authority
of the state in order to carry out specific and limited purposes; and (c) gov-
ernmental proprietary enterprises74-enterprises owned and operated by
the government that generate goods or services usually provided by private
enterprise. Due to the great variety of their activities, the relation of
subordinate governmental bodies to the sovereign ranges from close to very
distant.
Nongovernmental bodies are private organizations, such as privately held
utilities, to which governmental authority has been delegated.75 As a result,
their relation to the sovereign is usually highly attenuated.
67. See Olsen v. Smith, 195 U.S. 332, 344-45 (1904) (state legislative enactment permitting
only duly authorized agents to render pilotage services is not subject to antitrust laws). See also
Anderson v. Commission on Special Revenue, [1977] 2 Trade Cas. % 61,726 (Conn. Super. Ct.
Nov. 15, 1977) (restrictive contracts made by state commission are not subject to state antitrust
laws).
68. See New Mexico v. American Petrofina, Inc., 501 F.2d 363, 370 n.15 (9th Cir. 1974)
(antitrust suit by state against asphalt suppliers is state action).
69. See Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350 (1977); Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421
U.S. 773 (1975). For a detailed discussion of these cases, see notes 47-59 supra and accom-
panying text.
70. City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 98 S. Ct. 1123, 1138 (1978).
71. Id.
72. See, e.g, Kurek v. Pleasure Driveway and Park Dist., 557 F.2d 580 (7th Cir. 1977) (ac-
tion of subordinate governmental body not automatically state action), vacated 46 U.S.L.W.
3664 (U.S. Apr. 25, 1978) (No. 77-440) (remanded for further consideration in light of City of
Lafayette).
73. See, e.g, Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 791 (1975) (state bar association
is a state agency for limited purposes); City of Fairfax v. Fairfax Hosp. Ass'n, 562 F.2d 280,
284 (4th Cir. 1977) (industrial development authority created by county board of supervisors is
a state agency for limited purposes), vacated, 46 U.S.L.W. 3664 (U.S. Apr. 25, 1978) (No. 77-
826) (remanded for further consideration in light of City of Lafayette).
74. See, e.g, Hecht v. Pro-Football, Inc., 444 F.2d 931, 939 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Ladue Local
Lines, Inc. v. Bi-State Dev. Agency, 433 F.2d 131, 136-37 (8th Cir. 1970); E.W. Wiggins Air-
ways, Inc. v. Massachusetts Port Auth., 362 F.2d 52, 55-56 (1st Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 383
U.S. 947 (1966). See also City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 98 S. Ct. 1123,
1141-43 (1978) (Burger, CJ., concurring in the judgment).
75. See, e.g, Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 428 U.S. 579, 585 (1976); City of Fairfax v.
Fairfax Hosp. Ass'n, 562 F.2d 280, 282 (4th Cir. 1977) (hospital association, a private nonprofit
corporation, operating hospital that served the public), vacated, 46 U.S.L.W. 3664 (U.S. Apr.
25, 1978) (No. 77-826) (remanded for further consideration in light of City of Lafayette).
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After determining the category to which the defendant belongs, the sec-
ond step of the analysis is to decide whether, upon application of the rele-
vant test, the defendant qualifies for immunity. The immunity of ultimate
governmental bodies is tested under the basic Parker formula of whether
the state, acting in its sovereign capacity, commanded the restraint. Under
this standard, ultimate governmental bodies almost always attain immu-
nity. This is reflected in the Court's cause-and-effect analysis in Bates: the
Arizona Supreme Court "is the ultimate body wielding the State's power
over the practice of law and, thus, the restraint is 'compelled by direction of
the State acting as a sovereign.' "76 Courts will only deny immunity to an
ultimate governmental body if it participates in a private scheme to restrain
trade.77
The tests for immunity of subordinate governmental bodies are more
difficult to apply. The standard for state governmental subdivisions requires
that the state legislature have directed or authorized the anticompetitive
conduct.78 Since "directed" is a stricter test than "authorized," the "directed
or authorized" formula will, in practice, amount only to a question of
whether the state legislature has authorized the challenged restraint. The
City of Lafayette opinion does not make clear what measure of legislative
review and approval constitutes authorization. The plurality did note that a
state subdivision need not "point to a specific, detailed legislative authoriza-
tion" and that "[a]n adequate state mandate. . . exists. . . [if] the legisla-
ture contemplated the kind of action complained of."' 7 9 But the Court failed
to specify what level of legislative "contemplation" satisfies the standard.80
This produces a test of immunity that turns almost entirely on the facts of
each case.
The test for the immunity of state agencies for limited purposes requires
an equally extensive factual inquiry. In these cases, however, the standard is
whether the restraint was compelled by the state acting as sovereign.8 State
agencies for limited purposes do not so readily meet this test, since they are
76. Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 360 (1977) (citations omitted).
77. See Harman v. Valley Nat'l Bank of Ariz., 339 F.2d 564 (1964); note 41 supra and
accompanying text.
78. City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 98 S. Ct. 1123, 1137 (1978).
79. Id at 1138. (quoting City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 532 F.2d 431,
434 (5th Cir. 1977)). But see id at 1148 (Stewart, J., dissenting) ("[I]t is not clear from the
plurality opinion whether a municipal government's actions will be immune from the Sherman
Act if they are merely 'authorized' by a state legislature or whether they must be legislatively
'directed' in order to enjoy immunity.").
80. See Id. at 1148 (Stewart, J., dissenting) ("Mhe plurality gives no indication of how
specifically the legislature's 'direction' must relate to the 'action complained of.' ").
81. Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 360 (1977); Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421
U.S. 773, 791 (1974). The same test apparently applies to state proprietary enterprises. City of
Fairfax v. Fairfax Hosp. Ass'n, 562 F.2d 280, 285 (4th Cir. 1977), vacatea 46 U.S.L.W. 3664
(U.S. Apr. 25, 1978) (No. 77-826) (remanded for further consideration in light of City of
Lafayette).
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less clearly identified with the sovereign than are ultimate governmental
bodies.
Nongovernmental bodies must satisfy a still stricter test in order to obtain
immunity. First, the state must have compelled any restraint that they im-
pose.82 Second, the anticompetitive conduct must further a state policy.83
Although the presence or absence of the latter factor may influence the de-
termination of immunity for subordinate governmental bodies, 84 it be-
comes critical when a nongovernmental entity is the subject of the inquiry.
In such cases, the court must find that the state policy was an important
one,85 and a private, nongovernmental body may have difficulty showing
that it was entrusted with the implementation of such a policy.
III
APPLYING AMERICAN ANTITRUST LAWS TO FOREIGN
GOVERNMENTS
As foreign governments become more heavily involved in American
commerce,8 6 the chance that their activities will violate U.S. antitrust laws
increases.8 7 The risk of liability largely disappears, however, if the Parker
doctrine affords immunity to foreign as well as domestic states. The scope
of foreign governmental immunity may in fact be greater than that of do-
mestic states. U.S. courts have long recognized that attempts to apply the
antitrust laws abroad may cause diplomatic friction,88 and such friction
seems especially likely when the activities challenged are those of a foreign
government. The courts have therefore concluded that Congress did not
intend the antitrust laws to apply in situations where international tension
82. Although nongovernmental bodies rarely attain immunity under the Parker doctrine, a
number of state legislatures have exempted from antitrust liability the activities of industries
regulated by a state public service commission. The scope of these statutory exemptions varies
widely. See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 35-31(b) (Supp. 1978); CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 8107 (West);
Act of July 21, 1965, § 5(3), ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38, § 60-5(3) (1975).
83. Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 428 U.S. 579, 585 (1976).
84. See Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 361 (1977) ("[T]he regulation of the activi-
ties of the bar is at the core of the State's power to protect the public."); accord, City of
Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 98 S. Ct. 1123, 1137 (1978) (state policy to displace
competition); Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 363 (1943) (important state policy); cf.Goldfarb
v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 792-93 (1974) (no important state policies involved).
85. Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 428 U.S. 579, 597-98 (1976). Seenote 84 supra.
86. See notes 1-4 supra and accompanying text.
87. It is settled that the antitrust laws may be applied to activities of foreigners outside the
United States if those activities affect American commerce. See Timberlane Lumber Co. v.
Bank of America, 549 F.2d 597 (9th Cir. 1976); United States v. Aluminum Co. of America,
148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
88. See, ag, American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347 (1909). See generall,
Baker, 4ntitrust Conflicts Between Friends: Canada and the United States in the Mid-1970's, 11
CORNELL INT'L L.J. 165 (1978); Stanford, The Application of the Sherman Act to Conduct
Outside the United States:.A VewfromA broad, 11 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 195 (1978).
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would be likely to result.8 9 Moreover, the principle of international comity
entitles the interests of foreign governments to at least as much weight as
those of domestic states,90 and the "act of state" doctrine may prevent U.S.
courts from scrutinizing a foreign government's actions at all.9 1
Nevertheless, just as state government instrumentalities do not neces-
sarily enjoy the same immunity as do states themselves, foreign government
instrumentalities need not enjoy the same immunity as do foreign govern-
ments.92 Since the courts generally exercise caution in applying the antitrust
laws internationally, foreign government instrumentalities may in fact have
more freedom to act than instrumentalities of domestic states. 93 But the
strong interest of the United States in encouraging competition in both its
domestic and its international commerce94 entitles it to insist that any an-
ticompetitive activities engaged in by foreign government instrumentalities
meet the applicable test under Parker and its progeny before they are ac-
corded antitrust immunity. Parker is not, however, the only source of im-
munity; the doctrine of sovereign immunity may exempt foreign
government instrumentalities from liability under U.S. laws even when the
Parker doctrine does not.
A. THE FOREIGN SOVEREIGN IMMUNITIES AcT
As the report of the House Judiciary Committee indicates, the Foreign
Sovereign Immunities Act of 19769- "sets forth the sole and exclusive
standards to be used in resolving questions of sovereign immunity raised by
foreign states before Federal and State courts .... -96 The Act confers
89. See, e.g, Pacific Seafarers, Inc. v. Pacific Far East Line, Inc., 404 F.2d 804, 814 (D.C.
Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1093 (1969); United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148
F.2d 416, 443 (2d Cir. 1945) ("Yet when one considers the international complications likely to
arise from an effort in this country to treat such agreements as unlawful, it is safe to assume
that Congress certainly did not intend the Act to cover them.").
90. See generaly RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES [hereinafter cited as RESTATEMENT] § 40 (1965).
91. See Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964); RFSTATEMENT, supra
note 90, § 41 (1965). ButseeAlfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S. 682
(1976) (plurality opinion) ("act of state" doctrine does not apply when the activities in question
are purely commercial).
92. Compare notes 66-69 supra and accompanying text with notes 70-74 supra and accom-
panying text.
93. Where this greater freedom of action has led to monopoly or cartelization, one response
has been concerted action by American businessmen. See Hunt v. Mobil Oil Corp., 550 F.2d
68 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 98 S. Ct. 608 (1977); Davidow, Antitrust, Foreign Policy and
International Buying Cooperation, 84 YALE L.J. 268 (1974).
94. United States v. Topco Assocs., 405 U.S. 596, 610 (1972) ("Antitrust laws in general, and
the Sherman Act in particular, are the Magna Carta of free enterprise. They are as important
to the preservation of economic freedom and our free-enterprise system as the Bill of Rights is
to the protection of our fundamental personal freedoms.").
95. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1602-1611 (1976).
96. H.R. REP. No. 94-1487, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 12, reprintedin[1976 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 6604, 6610.
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broad immunity on foreign states and their political subdivisions, agencies,
and instrumentalities, 97 subject to several important exceptions.9" One of
these exceptions covers a foreign state's commercial activities: no immunity
exists in any case
in which the action is based upon a commercial activity carried on in the
United States by the foreign state; . . .or upon an act outside the territory of
the United States in connection with a commercial activity of the foreign
state elsewhere [when] that act causes a direct effect in the United States
99
The critical question, then, is how to distinguish commercial activities
from all other governmental activities. The Act provides that the "commer-
cial character" of any activity "shall be determined by reference to [its] na-
ture. . . rather than by reference to its purpose."l100 Thus, if a particular
government activity is one in which private enterprises also frequently en-
gage, a court will probably consider it to be commercial, and the fact that
the purpose of the activity may be the furtherance of a governmental func-
tion will be irrelevant.' 01 Significantly, many of the activities of foreign
government instrumentalities to which U.S. antitrust laws might apply can
be classified as commercial under this test. Where this is the case, these
instrumentalities cannot obtain exemption simply by pleading sovereign
immunity.
Instrumentalities of foreign governments may still enjoy antitrust immu-
nity if they can satisfy the applicable Parker test. The commercial character
of their activities should not prevent them from doing so, because these tests
require a more discriminating analysis of the type of connection, if any,
between the state and the alleged restraint of trade. In fact, several courts
97. 28 U.S.C. § 1603(a)-(b)(1976). An "agency or instrumentality of a foreign state" is de-
fined as
any entity-
(1) which is a separate legal person, corporate or otherwise, and
(2) which is an organ of a foreign state or political subdivision thereof, or a
majority of whose shares or other ownership interest is owned by a foreign state
or political subdivision thereof, and
(3) which is neither a citizen of a State of the United States . . . nor created
under the laws of any third country.
Id § 1603(b). The House Report gives as examples of such entities "a state trading corpora-
tion, a mining enterprise, a transport organization such as a shipping line or airline, a steel
company, a central bank, an export association, a governmental procurement agency or a de-
partment or ministry which acts and is usable in its own name." H.R. REP. No. 94-1487, 94th
Cong., 2d Sess. 15-16, reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 6604, 6614. Cf
Yessenin-Volpin v. Novosti Press Agency, 46 U.S.L.W. 2398 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 23, 1978) (Soviet
press agencies did not engage in commercial activity in writing and publishing articles alleg-
edly defaming plaintiff).
98. 28 U.S.C. § 1604 (1976).
99. Id. § 1605(a)(2).
100. Id. § 1603(d).
101. Id.
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have rejected the distinction between commercial and political activities as
a basis for deciding questions of antitrust immunity.'0 2
Therefore, a court presented with charges that a foreign government in-
strumentality has violated U.S. antitrust laws must answer three prelimi-
nary questions. First, does the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act exempt
the defendant from the jurisdiction of U.S. courts? This will turn on
whether or not the defendant's activities are deemed commercial. If they
are not, the court must dismiss the suit for lack of jurisdiction. 10 3 Second,
are the alleged violations covered by the Parker doctrine? Here, the answer
will depend upon the character of the instrumentality and whether it can
satisfy the applicable Parker test. If it can, the court must dismiss the suit
for failure to state a claim against the defendant. ° 4 Third, does the princi-
ple of comity bar the court in any event from entertaining the antitrust
claim? The court can reach the merits of the case only if, after weighing the
interests of the foreign state against those of the United States, it finds that
the interests of the United States are predominant. ' 05 The following hypo-
thetical case illustrates the method and problems of the proposed analysis
of a foreign government instrumentality's antitrust liability.10 6
B. A HYPOTHETICAL CASE
The Republic of Monopolis, concerned about its balance of payments
and continued economic dependence on other nations, decides to establish
a national shipping line. 10 7 It forms a state corporation for this purpose,
entrusting management of the corporation to a board appointed by the
Minister of Commerce. 0 8 The board has the power to direct day-to-day
operations and to develop long-range plans, which are submitted to the
Minister for review. After beginning operations, the board enters into an
agreement with two privately owned shipping companies incorporated
under the laws of a neighboring country. This agreement provides for vari-
ous forms of cooperation in the transportation of goods to and from foreign
102. See New Mexico v. American Petrofina, Inc., 501 F.2d 363 (9th Cir. 1974); Ladue
Local Lines, Inc. v. Bi-State Dev. Agency, 433 F.2d 131 (8th Cir. 1970). Contra, City of Lafay-
ette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 98 S. Ct. 1123, 1142 (1978) (Burger, C.J., concurring in
the judgment); Hecht v. Pro-Football, Inc., 444 F.2d 931 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
103. FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(2).
104. FED. R. Crv. P. 12(b)(6).
105. RESTATEMENT, supranote 90, § 40.
106. Because of the factual inquiry needed to apply the appropriate Parker test, this case
does not afford a basis for any conclusions concerning the scope of immunity of foreign gov-
ernment instrumentalities generally.
107. See Valente, The Participation of Developing Countries in Shioping INTL CONCILIA-
TION 27, 34 (Mar. 1971).
108. This corporation falls into the subcategory of governmental proprietary enterprises
within the larger category of subordinate governmental bodies. Seenote 74 supra and accom-
panying text.
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nations, including the United States. It also provides that none of the par-
ties will enter into any similar agreements with other shipping lines. Be-
cause no copy of the agreement was filed with the Federal Maritime
Commission for its approval, 10 9 the shipping line may not claim the anti-
trust exemption that Commission approval confers. 110 An American ship-
ping company engaged in transporting goods between the United States
and Monopolis brings suit against the parties to the agreement, alleging an
illegal conspiracy in restraint of trade. Monopolis' shipping line moves to
dismiss on the grounds of sovereign immunity and inapplicability of the
U.S. antitrust laws to its activities.
In ruling on these motions, the court should first consider the question of
sovereign immunity: if the shipping line is immune under the Foreign Sov-
ereign Immunities Act, the plaintiffs case must be dismissed. The shipping
line is certainly an instrumentality of the Republic of Monopolis. 111 The
challenged agreement excludes an American shipping company from the
cooperative scheme, and so is likely to have a direct effect in the United
States. Immunity therefore depends upon whether or not the line entered
into this agreement in connection with a commercial activity.112 Since its
activities promote Monopolis' economic independence, they may have a
political purpose, but their nature is clearly commercial. The House of Rep-
resentatives report on the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act lists a foreign
government's sale of a service as an example of commercial activity.113
Since operating a shipping line involves the sale of services, 1 4 Monopolis'
shipping line is not entitled to sovereign immunity.
The second question for the court is whether the alleged restraint of trade
meets the applicable Parker test. The test applied in City of Lafayette,'1 5
109. 46 U.S.C. § 814 (1976) requires that common carriers by water as defined in § 801 file
with the Federal Maritime Commission every agreement
fixing or regulating transportation rates or fares; giving or receiving special rates, ac-
commodations, or other special privileges or advantages; controlling, regulating,
preventing or destroying competition; pooling or apportioning earnings, losses, or traf-
fic; allotting ports or restricting or otherwise regulating the number and character of
sailings between ports; limiting or regulating in any way the volume or character of
freight or passenger traffic to be carried; or in any manner providing for an exclusive,
preferential, or cooperative working arrangement.
110. 46 U.S.C. § 814 (1976) provides that "[e]very agreement. . . lawful under this section
.. . shall be excepted from the provisions of sections 1 to 11 and 15 of Title 15 [the Sherman
and Clayton Acts] .... "
111. Seenote 97 supra.
112. See28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2) (1976).
113. H.R. REP. No. 94-1487,94th Cong., 2d Sess. 16, reprinted 1[1976] U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEws 6604, 6615.
114. See Pacific Seafarers, Inc. v. Pacific Far East Line, Inc., 404 F.2d 804, 811 (D.C. Cir.
1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1093 (1969) ("[Pilaintiffs, in participating in the market of supply-
ing the service of transportation in United States-flag vessels, were engaged in foreign com-
merce of the United States.").
115. Seetext accompanying notes 78-79 supra.
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which would require a showing that the state had authorized the shipping
line to enter into an agreement that would exclude American shipping com-
panies, may initially seem appropriate. 16 The shipping line, however, re-
sembles the bar associations in Bates and Goldfarb much more than it does
a municipality. Its function is restricted to the transportation of goods be-
tween Monopolis and its trading partners, and it therefore appears to be a
state agency for a limited purpose, as was the bar association in
Goldfarb.117 Although the Minister of Commerce may review the board's
decisions, it exercises considerable discretion in operating what is, after all,
essentially a commercial enterprise.
If the appropriate test is the one applied in Goldfarb and Bates,' 8 the
shipping line must, if it is to obtain immunity, show that the sovereign com-
manded it to enter into the challenged agreement. Because there is no indi-
cation that the Minister of Commerce ordered the board to enter into this
agreement, the shipping line should not be immune from American anti-
trust laws.
The court must still decide whether subjecting Monopolis' national ship-
ping line to possible liability for violating U.S. law is consistent with inter-
national comity. This requires the court to balance the interests of
Monopolis in the alleged restraint against those of the United States in its
elimination." 9 The question is essentially one of fairness. Monopolis'
objectives in establishing a national shipping line are clearly very impor-
tant, since they involve not only its desire for economic independence, but
possibly its national security. 120 Yet there is nothing to suggest that an
agreement that serves to exclude American shipping companies from a par-
ticular market is essential to the attainment of these objectives. Applying
the antitrust laws to such an agreement would not, therefore, necessarily
frustrate any fundamental policies of Monopolis, and would further the
strong American interest in promoting free competition.' 2 ' In addition, the
shipping line could have used an available procedure for obtaining exemp-
tion from the antitrust laws for the challenged agreement.' 22 Because the
line did not follow this procedure, and because the result was an alleged
restraint of trade not formally sanctioned by either the United States or
Monopolis, comity should not prevent application of American antitrust
laws to the activities of Monopolis' national shipping line.
116. The shipping line is closely tied to the state: its board of directors is charged with
implementing important public policies and acts under the supervision of the Minister of
Commerce. Moreover, because it is a state corporation, it serves no private interests.
117. See notes 52-53 supra and accompanying text.
118. Seenote 81 supraand accompanying text.
119. Seenote 90 supraand accompanying text.
120. SeeValente, supranote 107, at 27.
121. Seenote 94 supra.
122. Seenotes 109-10 supra.
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CONCLUSION
The antitrust liability of foreign government instrumentalities assumes
increasing importance as foreign states expand their influence in the Ameri-
can economy. Although U.S. courts have rarely considered the question,
the recent series of Parker doctrine cases in domestic antitrust law provides
a useful framework for examining it. Such an examination indicates that
foreign government instrumentalities may incur antitrust liability whenever
they engage in commercial activity directly affecting American commerce.
They can avoid liability only if the foreign state acting as sovereign has
commanded or perhaps authorized the activity, or if international comity
requires that the United States not apply its laws. But the effect of possible
antitrust liability on the involvement of foreign governments in the Ameri-
can economy is still not clear.
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